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The

at least suggest a particular attitude towards summary
judgment.' They also correspond temporally with a dramatic decrease in the
number of civil trials.7
Supr enne Court decided

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure turn 70 this
year-a set of New-Deal-era rules being used to
litigate modern

federal civil litigation.

In Scott, the

that a video of a hi -speed police chase
Last term, the Supreme
The other element is
the evidentiary use of
Court's decision in Scott
recordings
of
video
provided a singul ar version of events
v. Harris' merged two
Ld
elements of modern justifying summaryju gment, but the reality encounters between law
enforcement and citicivil rights litigation in
zens, such as interrogais that video eviden( =e provides no greater
one case with far-reachha
certainty about "wt t really happened"
ing procedural consetions, traffic stops, and, in
Scott, high-speed chases.
quences.
Video is widely favored as
sstestimony.
than does wit Ln
One element is the
a way to monitor both
dramatic expansion of
police and citizen conduct, by, it is believed, providing an
summary judgment under the Federal Rules over the past
objective, unambiguous picture of these encounters.' Jes20 years. Summary judgment has morphed from a procedure that halted cases prior to trial only if ajury can reasonably choose only one of several competing factual
1. 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007).
inferences' into "something more like a gestalt verdict
2.Jack H. Friedenthal, Cases on SummaryJudgment: Has There Been a Material Change in Standards?, 63 NoTia DAME L. REv. 770, 785 (1986); Anderson
based on an early snapshot of the case. "'
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. R 56(c).
3. Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REv. 1797, 1917
Various studies over the past decade find anywhere
(1998).
from 7 percent to more than 20 percent of all civil cases
4. See Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing 7hals and Summary Judgment in Federal
terminated on summary judgment.4 A 2007 Federal Judi- Civil Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?,1 J. EMroucAL L. STUD. 591,
592-93, 616 (2004); Arthur R. Miller, The PretrialRush to Judgment:Are the "Litcial Center study found summaryjudgment motions filed
igation Explosion," "Liability Crisis," and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in
in 17 of every 100 case terminations, more in civil rights Court andJury Dial Commitments, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 982, 1048-49 (2003); Wald,
supra n. 3, at 1915.
cases, with 60 percent of those motions granted in whole
5. See Federal judicial Center, Estimates of Summary JudgmentActivity in fiisor in part, 70 percent in civil rights cases? These numbers cal Year 2006 (on file with author).
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sica Silbey calls such video proof "evidence verite, filmic evidence that purports to be unmediated and
unselfconscious film footage of actual
events."'
The substantive crux of Scott was
whether an officer used excessive
force in ramming a suspect's car during a high-speed pursuit as a way of
ending the chase. The Court concluded that a "police officer's
attempt to terminate a dangerous
high-speed car chase that threatens
the lives of innocent bystanders does
not violate the Fourth Amendment,
even when it places the fleeing
motorist at risk of serious injury or
death."" That Fourth Amendment
conclusion has received the most
attention from lower courts and
commentators."
But the Court reached that decision on summary judgment, on its
determination that a video of the
chase, taken from the pursuing officer's dash-mounted camera, presented the single "true" version of
events and permitted the Court to
ignore contradictory testimony from
the plaintiff. As a result, there was
no issue of material fact as to the
reasonableness of the officer's
action and no reason or opportunity
for a jury trial. This procedural element likely will have a lasting effect.
Courts long have struggled to integrate evidence verite into the trial
process. Scott reflects the Supreme
Court's effort and, arguably, failure
to properly integrate video evidence
into the pretrial process and summary judgment.

6. See Miller, supra n. 4, at 1050.
7. Burbank, supra n. 4, at 618; Martin H.
Redish, SummaryJudgment and the Vanishing Tial:
Implications of the LitigationMatrix, 57 STAN. L. REv,
1329, 1333 (2005).
8. Jessica M. Silbey, Filmmaking in the Pecinct
House and the Genre ofDocumentay Filmn,29 COLU. J.
L. & ARTS, 107,116 (2005); Ric Simmons, Why 2007
is Not Like 1984: A Broader Perspective on Technology s
Fffect on Privacy and FourthAmendmentJurisprudence?
97J. CRim. & CRMInNoLOcY 531, 566 (2007).
9. Jessica M. Silbey, Judges as Film Critics: New
Approaches to lilmic Evidence, 37 U. MICH. J. L. REF.
493, 507 (2004) (emphasis in original).
10. Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1779 (2007);
Beshers v. Harrison, 495 E.3d 1260, 1267-68 (11th
Cir. 2007).
11. Beshers v. Harrison, 495 F 3d 1260 (11th
Cir. 2007); Andrew T. George, Rediscovering

The video
In March 2001, Victor Harris was
clocked traveling 73 mph in a 55mph speed zone on a county road in
Georgia; a county deputy sheriff
sought to pull him over. Harris drove
off, initiating a high-speed pursuit by
several county deputies, including
Deputy Timothy Scott. The cars, at
times exceeding 85 mph, traveled
primarily along two-lane roads, into
and around a shopping-mall parking
lot, and continued down two-lane
highways. After traveling ten miles in
six minutes, Scott requested and
received permission to perform a
maneuver designed to cause Harris'
car to spin to a stop. Instead, Scott
bumped the rear of Harris' car; the
car left the roadway, went down an
and
embankment, overturned,
crashed. Harris was rendered a quadriplegic."
Harris sued Scott and Coweta
County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive
use of force, a form of unreasonable
seizure. Scott moved for summary
judgment, asserting an affirmative
defense of qualified immunity, which
entails a two-part inquiry: 1) Whether
the facts and evidence show that the
officer's conduct violated a constitutional fight and 2) If so, whether the
fight was clearly established at the
time, in light of the specific factual
context of the case, such that a reasonable officer would have known
that his particular conduct violated
the right. Bumping Harris' car constituted a seizure, thus the issue on the
first prong was its reasonableness. On

Dangerousness: The Expanded Scope of Reasonable
Deadly Force after Scott v. Harris, 93 VA. L. REV. IN
BRIEF 129 (2007), http://w-.virginialawreview.
orgi inbrief/2007/07/09/george.pdf.
12. Scott, 127 S Ct. at 1773.
13. Id. at 1774-76.
14. Miller, supran. 4, at 1067; Redish, supra n. 7,
at 1355.
15. The Court took the unprecedented step of
"allow[ing] the video to speak for itself' by posting
it on the Supreme Court's web site. Scott, 127 S. Ct.
at 1775 n.5; http://,vwsupremecourtus.gov/
opinions/video/scott N harris.rmvb. Many hailed
this as indicating that the justices were becoming
more in-tune with modern techoology and,
in effect, modern procedure. See http://
www.abovethelav.com/2007/04/video clips not
just for_onlin.php.
16. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1775-76.

summary judgment, the court typically answers the first question by
viewing the facts and drawing reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the non-movant, meaning the court adopts the plaintiff's
version of the facts. 3
The central issue was whether Harris' conduct in leading law enforcement on the high-speed chase posed
a danger to pedestrians or other
motorists or vehicles; if his actions
endangered the public, then Deputy
Scott's decision to bump Harris' car
was reasonable. The versions of
events presented by Harris and Scott
differed substantially, which ordinarily precludes summary judgment; it
is for the jury at trial, not the court
on summary judgment, to choose
between competing reasonable stories grounded on affirmative testimonial evidence from competing
witnesses. 4
But the majority insisted that summary judgment was appropriate
because of the "added wrinkle" of a
video of the chase recorded from
Scott's dash-mounted camera, which
captured the chase from the
moment he switched on his siren
light. 5 The video told a different
story, one that "quite clearly contradicts the version" from Harris. Contrary to Harris' testimony, this was "a
Hollywood-style car chase of the most
frightening sort, placing police officers and innocent bystanders alike at
great risk of serious injury." The
Court insisted, without citation, that
when opposing parties tell different
stories and one of those stories is
"blatantly contradicted" by the rest of
the record (here, the video), a court
could (in fact, must) disregard the
"visible fiction" of the plaintiff's
testimony and his now-discredited
version of events. The ordinary
requirement that the court -view the
facts in favor of the non-movant gives
way to the court viewing the facts in
the light depicted by the videotape."
Having disregarded one version of
events, summary judgment became
appropriate because a rational jury
only could accept the singular, unambiguous version of events presented
in the video.
www.ajs.org JUDICATURE
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Video evidence on
summary judgment
On its face, Scott is a case for which
summary judgment never should be
appropriate. The primary proof of
what happened during the chase was
the competing testimony of the two
parties, two sides telling different
affirmative stories. As a formal matter, a court on summary judgment
should not choose between conflicting testimony; it should assume that
the non-movant's version would be
believed, then consider whether a
reasonable jury could resolve the
case in his favor based on that evidence." The bromide long has been
that, for purposes of summaryjudgment, "a single scoundrel's testimony
may outweigh that of forty bishops. " "
The notion that one party's testimony could be "blatantly contradicted by the record" is inconsistent
with summary judgment, at least in a
case involving affirmative testimonial
versions of events.
The video, however, changed this
from a he-said/he-said case of com-

peting eyewitness testimony. Harris'
testimony simply was inaccurate and
wrong and could be disregarded
because it conflicted with the video
that the Court could view for itself.
This assumed, of course, that the
video was, as a matter of law, accurate
and correct. The video made the
truth, and thus the only reasonable
result-judgment in Scott's favor
and against Harris-so obvious that
trial was unnecessary. In light of the
video, which told a singular incontrovertible story, no reasonable fact
finder could believe Harris' version
of events. Thus the Court's unsupported insistence that it could ignore
testimony that was contradicted by
other, non-testimonial evidence.
Commentators frequently complain that courts on summary judgment often credit and adopt one of
two versions of facts, even where
either seems reasonable."' But Scott
may be the first time the Court has
been so explicit about rejecting one
story because evidence shows a "better" story. And that explicitness
results from the presence of video
evidence. It allowed the majority to
182

respond to, and decide the case on,
its "brute sense impressions.""
Three myths
But in treating the video as truthful,
unbiased, objective, and unambiguous, and thus deserving of controlling and dispositive weight on
summary judgment, the Court
silently bought into the three basic,
related myths that Jessica Silbey has
identified about video evidence and
evidence verite.
The first is that film is an objective,
unbiased, transparent moral observer,
producing an evenhanded reproduction of realitv21 Video evidence is the
"proverbial smoking gun," raw evidence incontrovertibly showing what
happened in the real world.2 The
video becomes "an unimpeachable
eyewitness ....
testifying to the only
version of what happened."2 In fact,
video replaces the eyewitness, making
live testimony and corroboration
unnecessary.2Or,
on summary judgment, allowing the court to disregard
testimony altogether in favor of the
video. This was captured by the
Court's insistence that the video could
"speak for itself."25
The second myth is that the meaning of the video is unambiguous and
obvious to the viewer, the "last and
best word on what happened" in the
real-world events."
The third myth is that the video
transforms the viewer into an eyewitness to real events, the video "merely
7
an extension of the jury's eye."2
Viewers believe they are witnessing
the events as they occur and thus
fully understand the truth and mean2
ing of those events. 1
Unfortunately the Court got
caught up in these myths. Video of
an event is not the event itself, but
merely evidence of the event. Video,
17. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
18. Richard L. Marcus, Completing Equit', s Conquest? Reflectioni on the Futreof Tol

Under the Jebd-

eralRules of Civil Procedure. 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 725,
772 (1989).
19. See Miller, supra n. 4, at 1067
20. Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffnan, and Donald Braman, VWhose
Eytes Are You Going to Believe? An
Empnical (and Noraive)Assessment of Scott v. Harris,
available at http:!/papers.ssni.coin/sol3 papers.
cfm?abstract id=1081227.
21. Silbey, Fimmaking, supra n. 8, at 1i11 127:
Silbey, Critics, supra n. 9, at 508.
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"like any representational form,
must be interpreted, and its specific
language and its way of constructing
meaning must be accounted for."2"
Factfinders must interpret and judge
a film's message, just as they interpret and judge all evidence and testimony; "Ujlust as no witness is
infallible, no film is singular in its
meaning or significance."" The Scott
majority ignored all of this. The
video put the justices on the scene of
the chase and told them what happened. They did not need to hear
from witnesses, least of all from a witness such as Harris, whose testimony
would contradict what the justices
knew they saw, as a matter of law, on
the video. And the jury did not have
to hear any of it.
Two different stories
Justice Stevens recognized these
myths in his sharply worded dissent.
Stevens watched the same video, but
saw a different event-not only was
there not obviously a danger to the
public in the chase, there were not
even any "close calls."" The video
told Stevens that no pedestrians,
parked cars, or private residences
were visible in the video at any point,
meaning there was no risk to person
or property in the chase; Harris
never lost control of the car and signaled whenever he changed lanes or
went across the center line to pass;
and the cars that he did pass already
had pulled over to the side of the
road, perhaps in response to the
police siren.
Stevens' larger, though unstated
point, was that the chase video, as
with other film evidence, was not
unambiguous and its narrative not
single or obvious. Nor did the video
alone tell the entire story. Consider,
for example, whether Harris ran any
22. Silbey, Critics,
supra n. 9, at 550.
23.Id. at 519.
24. Silbey, Critics,
supra n. 9, at 516.
25. ,Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1775 n.5.
26. Silbey, Filrnmaking,supra n. 8, at 111; Silbey,
Critics, supro n. 9, at 508-09.
27. Silbe, Critics, su a n. 9, at 519.
28. Silbe, Filmmaking supra n. 8, at 124.
29. Silhe, Critics, supra n. 9. at 519.
30. hd.
31. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1783 (SevensJ., dissenting).

red lights during the chase, an act
that would pose a threat to other
drivers and pedestrians. The majority insisted, based on the video, that
he ran multiple red lights. But,
Stevens suggested, the video actually
showed only that the lights were red
when the police car passed through
the intersection; it did not show the
color of the light when Harris' car
some distance ahead of the camera
mounted in the trailing police car,
went through those intersections."
Similarly, all agreed the video
showed Harris crossing the center
line at several points. But the majority saw him swerving into oncoming
traffic, while Stevens saw him signaling and making a routine passing
maneuver on a two-lane road, albeit
at a high rate of speed."
The point is that the video told the
majority and the dissent two very different tales. The video's meaning,
and the consistency of any testimony
with the video, was not so obvious
that a reasonable jury could reach
only one conclusion or inference;
different interpretations reasonably
were possible. The video, in other
words, did not, "speak for itself;" it
said what different listeners saw and
heard. And a new empirical study
suggests that what they see and hear
turns along cultural lines of race,
sex, age, class, and political viewpoint. " This renders the majority's
insistence that courts view the facts
"in the light depicted by the videotape"' 5 incoherent as a standard for
summary judgment because there is
no single and complete set of facts
depicted in the videotape. What facts
were depicted in the videotape
depends on the viewer's interpretation, a determination necessarily left
to the finder of fact." Stevens suggested that the majority had usurped
the trial function by twice derisively
referring to the members of the
32. Compare id. at 1775 with id. at 1782 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
33. Compare id. at 1775 with id. at 1783 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
34. Kahan, et al., supra n. 20.
35. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1776.
36. Id. al 1782 (StevensJ., dissenting).
37. Id. at 1781, 1782 (StevensJ., dissenting).
38. Silbey, Critics,supra n. 9, at 550.

majority as 'jurors. ' ' 17 Rather, given a
video that tells multiple competing
stories, summary judgment analysis
demands that the Court adopt the
interpretation or understanding
most favorable to the non-movant,
Harris.

Changed meaning
Moreover, trial itself often serves to
undermine the supposedly fixed,
transparent, and uncontroversial
meaning of film, because the way that
a video is viewed, alone or in conjunction with other evidence, may change
its meaning. The most famous example of this is the state criminal trial of
the Los Angeles police officers
accused of beating motorist Rodney
King in 1991, where the officers were
acquitted despite video evidence of
the assault. One explanation for the
acquittal was defense success in

attaching a new narrative and new
meaning to the video. They did this,
in part, by slowing the video for
frame-by-frame review and having the
officers on the stand explain each
individual action by each actor. The
result was a reinterpretation of the
video; the officers were not on the
offensive and beating a helpless victim, but were constantly on the defensive and responding to King's
aggressive actions. In essence,
defense counsel cross-examined the
video, drawing from it a different
message, creating ambiguity in its
meaning, and allowing the video to
corroborate, rather than contradict,
the officers' version of events.'
One could imagine a similar trial
tactic with the video in Scott. The reasonableness of Deputy Scott's decision to forcibly terminate the chase
turns on whether Harris was a threat
www.ajs.org JUDICATURE
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to other cars, drivers, property, and
pedestrians. But imagine Scott testifying at trial as plaintiff's counsel
slows the video to a frame-by-frame
presentation and, at each frame,
questions Scott as to what Harris was
doing, what each of the other cars on
the road were doing, and what was
the specific danger to the public at
each point. Of course, defense counsel could utilize the same tactic to
undermine Harris' version of events.
But that is the purpose of trials with
live witnesses and cross examination.
This trial tactic renders the video
neutral and ties its meaning back to
the testimony of the competing
courtroom witnesses. The case once
again becomes a he-said/he-said dispute of diverging eyewitness
accounts, with the video merely
dovetailing onto the witness testimony. 9 The video no longer blatantly and per se contradicts Harris'
testimony, nor is the Court free to
disregard his story on summaryjudgment. The jury must resolve the competing versions of events, in
conjunction with the video, through
the ordinary fact-finding processes in
which juries engage: evaluating credibility, drawing inferences from
everything they had seen and heard,
and deciding what all the evidence
"means" and what it reveals about
what happened on a two-line highway in Georgia and whether Deputy
Scott's actions were reasonable.
The lure of video evidence, conceived as providing an unmediated
and correct account of events, is particularly strong in a case such as Scott.
Not only does the video appear singular and unambiguous. But a case
based on competing eyewitness
accounts is inherently one in which
we never can really know what happened in the real world. At best, the
jury engages in conjecture, based on
its evaluation of witness credibility
and other inferences from the evidence it sees.' As Martin Redish
argues, we "refer to the jury's verdict
as the 'accurate' result, but this is
simply a convenient method by
which we operationalize accuracy,
because we simply have no choice.""
Video evidence, such as a real-time
184

recording of events, holds out hope
for the desired greater certainty as to
what happened in police-citizen confrontations.
Scott tells us not only that this certainty is available, but that it can be
be done without even the need for a
jury. But the reality is that video evidence provides no greater certainty
about "what really happened" during
the chase than live-witness testimony
from the pursuer and pursued. Recognizing that fact is necessary to
avoid further unwarranted expansion of the summary judgment
device and further incursion into the
jury's role in video-evidence civilrights actions.

Conclusion
Scott could be understood as adopting a per se rule that leading police
on a high-speed chase poses an
imminent danger to the public and
allows officers to use deadly force to
end the pursuit.42 Such a substantive
rule justifies the outcome procedurally. What the video showed and
meant is irrelevant, since the only
material factual issue becomes
whether this was a high-speed chase,
which was undisputed without
regard to the video, entitling the
defendant to judgment as a matter of
law. Of course, such a rule also renders the majority's entire analysis of
the video meaningless.
In the wake of Scott, courts have
begun to see more § 1983 Fourth
Amendment actions in which an
encounter with police is captured on
video and the video plays a role on
summary judgment.", And some
lower courts have begun to wield this
Scott-granted power to disregard testimony in the face of competing video
evidence on summary judgment."
On the other hand, in September
2007, the mirror of the events in
Scott made the rounds of the internet: A camera mounted in the back
of a citizen's car captured an abusive
and aggressive police officer during
a routine traffic stop, directing profanities at the driver and threatening
to arrest him on fabricated charges."
The officer was terminated following
review of the video by police and city
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officials. "
The question remains how courts
will and should treat that video when
the driver brings his inevitable §
1983 action against the officer. Will
the court regard the video as the
conclusive, unambiguous, objective
and "true" version of the encounter?
Will the court disregard the officer's
testimony if it conflicts with the
video? Will the officer be similarly
deprived of the opportunity to present his version of events to a jury, if
the court finds that version different
than its interpretation of the video?
Will the court insist that it must view
the evidence in light of the video,
regardless of the officer's testimony
or version of events?
These questions inevitably arise as
video recordings of encounters
between citizens and law enforcement become more common, on
both sides of the encounter. That will
determine the long-term consequences of the Scott Court's procedural faith that video evidence can
and should eliminate all factual disputes and obviate the need for finders of fact and trials. v,;

HOWARD M. WASSERMAN
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39. Id. at 498.
40. Redish, supra n. 7, at 1352-53.
41. Id. at 1352.
42. Beshers v. Harrison, 495 F.3d 1260, 1272
(11th Cir. 2007) (Presnell, J., concurring); but see
Harris,127 S. Ct. at 1779 (GinsburgJ., concurring).
43. Mecham v. Frazier, 500 E3d 1200 (10th Cir.
2007); Green v. NewJersey State Police, 2007 WL
2453580 (3d Cir. 2007).
44. Beshers v. Harrison, 495 E3d 1260, 1262 n.1
(11th Cir. 2007).
45. http://wAwv.sttoday.com/stltoday/news/
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5B68086257353001498DC?OpenDocument. The
video quickly began making the rounds on the
internet. http://w w.xomba.com/brett-darrowcop-video_0
46. http://www.zimbio.com/pilot?ID=&URL=
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